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In Defense of the PIP Regulations
WALTER D. SCHWIDETZKY*
Abstract
The section 704(b) allocation Regulations contain a highly complex safe 
harbor, the substantial economic effect rules. If an allocation fails to comply 
with the safe harbor, it will only survive scrutiny if it is in accordance with 
the “partners’ interests in the partnership” (PIP). Given the complexity of the 
safe harbor, one might expect the PIP Regulations to be similarly complex, 
but nothing could be further from the truth. The PIP Regulations are, by 
tax standards, concise and straightforward. Some have argued that the PIP 
Regulations do not provide enough guidance, and that a more complex and 
comprehensive set of regulations would be preferable. In this Article, I argue 
that judges have made successful use of the PIP Regulations, and that a more 
complex set of PIP Regulations would achieve little and indeed might cause 
more problems than they solve. Accordingly, I argue against any substantial 
amendment to the PIP Regulations, though I would provide a safe harbor for 
target allocations.
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I.  Introduction
A “partner’s interest in a partnership” (PIP) over time has played an increas-
ingly large role in partnership allocation structures that practitioners design 
and hope comply with section 704(b). It is surprising, therefore, that PIP 
has received relatively modest attention in scholarly and professional arti-
cles.1 This Article is an attempt to help remedy that imbalance. What atten-
tion the Regulations on PIP have received has often been critical. I believe 
that much of this criticism is unfair. I hope to persuade the reader that the 
PIP Regulations are, in fact, reasonable in their length and scope and about 
the best we can expect from the Service under the circumstances. That said, 
I believe the addition of a safe harbor or two would make the allocation 
Regulations more predictable.
II. Background
A.  Tax Partnerships
Throughout this Article when I use the term partnership, I mean an entity 
that is classified as a partnership for federal tax purposes. That includes, of 
course, any state-law partnership but also most LLCs with two or more mem-
bers. Under the default rule of the Check-the-Box Regulations, an LLC with 
two or more members is classified as a partnership for tax purposes.2
B.  Passthrough Taxation
To begin at the beginning, in the United States, businesses ordinarily have 
two passthroughs to choose from, partnerships and S corporations. They are 
called passthroughs because they are normally not taxed at the entity level. 
Income and deductions flow through and are taken into account by the part-
ners or shareholders. For the most part, S corporations have no allocation 
1 My research turned up three scholarly articles, none recent. See Bradley T. Borden, The 
Allure and Illusion of Partners’ Interests in a Partnership, 79 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1077 (2011); Paul 
Carman, In Search of Partner’s Interest in the Partnership: The Alternative of Substantial Economic 
Effect, 107 J. Tax’n 214 (Oct. 2007); Stephen Utz, Allocation and Reallocation in Accordance 
with the Partners’ Interests in the Partnership, 56 Tax Law. 357 (2003). 
2 Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1)(i).
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flexibility; income and deductions must be allocated to the shareholders 
based on their ownership interests.3 Partnerships, on the other hand, have 
great flexibility and are often the preferred vehicle for that reason. Partnership 
allocations of income and deduction do not necessarily need to be made in 
accordance with the partners’ interests in partnership capital. Someone who, 
for example, contributed ten percent of the capital to a partnership can be 
allocated all of the section 168(k) bonus depreciation deductions, provided 
the partnership complies with section 704(b).
C.  Substantial Economic Effect Rules
Section 704(b) provides that a partner’s allocable share of income and 
deduction is determined based on PIP if (1) the partnership agreement does 
not provide how partnership income and deductions should be allocated, 
or (2) the allocations in the partnership agreement do not have “substantial 
economic effect.” The regulations contain extensive rules on the definition of 
substantial economic effect. Professor Lawrence Lokken may have made the 
most oft-quoted statement about the substantial economic effect rules: They 
are “a creation of prodigious complexity . . . essentially inpenetrable [sic] to 
all but those with the time, talent, and determination to become thoroughly 
prepared experts on the subject.”4 The legal literature is not wanting for dis-
cussions of these rules.5 Alas, a brief discussion is nonetheless necessary as it is 
important to know when a partnership has diverged from these rules.
The substantial economic effect rules require the partnership to keep capi-
tal accounts for the partners that meet the following requirements:6
A partner’s capital account is increased by:
1. The amount of money contributed to the partnership.
2. The fair market value of property contributed to the partnership (net 
of liabilities secured by the property that the partnership is consid-
ered to assume or take subject to under section 752). 
3. Allocations of partnership book income and gain, including tax-
exempt income.
A partner’s capital account is decreased by:
1. The amount of money distributed to the partner.
3 There is a bit of wiggle room. One has to be careful to avoid creating what could be 
counted as a second class of stock (which would end the S election), but under some circum-
stances employees or shareholders can be given stock options, bonuses, etc., which can give 
them a bigger share of income than their stock ownership alone would permit. 
4 Lawrence Lokken, Partnership Allocations, 41 Tax L. Rev. 545, 621 (1986).
5 Professor Lokken’s outstanding article was followed by many other efforts. I cannot resist 
mentioning one: Richard M. Lipton, Paul Carman, Charles Fassler & Walter D. Sch-
widetzky, Partnership Taxation ch. 5 (4th ed. 2017). This Article is informed by our effort, 
though I will not necessarily cite each instance.
6 Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b).
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2. The fair market value of property distributed to the partner (net of 
liabilities secured by the property that the partner is considered to 
assume or take subject to under section 752).
3. Allocations of expenditures of the partnership that can neither be 
capitalized nor deducted in computing taxable income.
4. Allocations of partnership book loss and deduction.
Capital accounts are increased or decreased for “book” gain, loss, income, 
and deduction, which very roughly correspond to economic gain, loss, 
income, and deduction.7 Tax items and book items can be the same. If a 
partnership has gross income of $100,000, the gross income is the same for 
book and tax purposes. But tax items and economic items can also be differ-
ent. Assume, for example, that a partner contributes property to a partner-
ship with a tax basis of $10,000 and a fair market value of $15,000. The 
partner’s capital account is increased by the full $15,000, while her tax basis 
in the partnership interest is increased by $10,000 under section 722. The 
partnership’s “book value” for the property is $15,000, but its tax basis in the 
property is $10,000 under section 723. The capital accounts are adjusted for 
any “book” depreciation which is calculated as a percentage of book value. 
Under these facts, book depreciation would be greater than tax depreciation. 
If the property in the example goes up in value in the hands of the partnership 
to $22,000, upon a sale—ignoring depreciation deductions or other adjust-
ments—the partnership has book gain equal to $22,000 – $15,000 = $7,000. 
That amount is reflected in the partners’ capital accounts. The tax gain is 
computed as $22,000 – $10,000 = $12,000 and is not, as such, reflected in 
the capital accounts.8 Tax gain is allocated under the rules of section 704(c), 
which, thankfully, are beyond the scope of this Article. 
The substantial economic effect test is actually two tests in one. An alloca-
tion must have economic effect, and that economic effect must be substantial. 
To meet what might be called the “regular” economic effect test, the partner-
ship allocations must comply with these rules:9
1. The partnership must keep capital accounts in accordance with the 
rules described above.
2. When an interest of a partner is liquidated, the partner must be paid 
any positive balance in her capital account.
3. If a partner has a deficit balance in her capital account, she must 
pay the deficit to the partnership by the end of the tax year in 
7 See Lipton et al., supra note 5, at §§ 5.02, 5.05.
8 Id. See also Borden, supra note 1, at 1099 (stating that capital accounts are adjusted for 
taxable income and for tax loss and deduction). As my discussion shows, the capital accounts 
are adjusted for book income, loss, and deduction, which can be equal to taxable income, loss, 
and deduction but need not be.
9 Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b).
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which her partnership interest is liquidated (or, if later, 90 days after 
liquidation). 
This last rule is sometimes called a “deficit restoration obligation” (DRO). 
At the risk of oversimplifying, for the economic effect of an allocation to be 
substantial, after the allocation, on a present-value, after-tax basis, there must 
be a strong likelihood that at least one partner is better off and at least one 
other partner is worse off than if the allocation had not been made.10 Example 
5 from the Regulations is a fairly easy illustration of an allocation that has 
economic effect but lacks substantiality.11 In Example 5, a partnership has 
two otherwise equal partners, one in a low income tax bracket and the other 
in a high income tax bracket. The partnership earns reliable, equal amounts 
of taxable and tax-exempt income. All of the taxable income and a portion 
of the tax-exempt income are allocated to the low-bracket taxpayer, and the 
rest of the tax-exempt income is allocated to the high-bracket taxpayer. The 
Example does the calculations, which I will spare the reader, but suffice it to 
say that on a present-value, after-tax basis, both partners are better off than if 
each had been allocated a 50% share of each kind of income. Assuming there 
is a strong likelihood that this outcome will occur, as is the case under the 
facts of the Example, the economic effect of the allocation is not substantial, 
and the allocation is not allowed. I will address how the Regulation reallocates 
the income below.12
Note that the substantial economic effect rules constitute a safe harbor. 
Typically, however, a partner will not want to comply with the regular eco-
nomic effect test given the unlimited DRO, which effectively can subject 
the partner to unlimited liability. As a consequence, there is an “alternate 
economic effect test”—and thus an alternative safe harbor—in which an allo-
cation to a partner can have economic effect even if the partner does not have 
an unlimited—or any—DRO.13 There is also an “economic effect equiva-
lence test” that provides that even if the partnership does not formally meet 
the economic effect test, the allocation will still be allowed if, as of the end of 
each relevant taxable year, a liquidation of the partnership would produce the 
same economic results to the partners as would have occurred if the require-
ments of the regular test for economic effect had been satisfied, regardless 
of the performance of the partnership—a bit of a long shot.14 There are also 
many variations on the substantiality theme in the Regulations. There are 
“shifting” and “transitory” allocation tests that provide that the economic 
10 Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(a).
11 Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(5), Ex. (5).
12 See infra text accompanying notes 30–32.
13 See Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d).
14 See Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(i). Some practitioners have argued that target allocations, 
discussed below (see infra Part II.F.1), can meet this test.  That generally should not be true. 
Target allocations will not reliably yield the same results year in and year out as the economic 
effect test.
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effect of the allocation is not substantial when there is a strong likelihood that 
the capital account balances of the partners would not differ substantially if 
the allocation were not present, and the allocation causes the tax liabilities 
of the relevant partners to drop.15 Thus, these rules attempt to control the 
same abuses as illustrated in Example 5, prohibiting a tax benefit without 
a corresponding shift in the partners’ economic positions. The focus of this 
Article is on PIP, not the substantial economic effect test, so I will not probe 
the intricacies of the substantial economic effect test further.
D.  Associated Safe Harbors
There are times when the Regulations provide a safe harbor that deems 
an allocation that does not have substantial economic effect nonetheless to 
be in accordance with PIP, making it permissible. The Regulations have a 
highly detailed safe harbor for allocating nonrecourse deductions, i.e., deduc-
tions attributable to nonrecourse debt.16 These latter rules are necessary since 
allocations attributable to nonrecourse debt cannot have economic effect 
inasmuch as the creditor, not the partners, bears the ultimate economic risk. 
Similarly, the allocation of tax credits also cannot have economic effect. Tax 
credits are, to state the obvious, a tax and not an economic item. Tax credits 
are not reflected in capital accounts. A safe harbor was created under which 
tax credits can be safely allocated.17 While the nonrecourse debt and tax credit 
safe harbors constitute reasonable solutions to the problems posed, they pro-
vide no real guidance on how to determine PIP in other circumstances.
E.  PIP
Ordinarily, when a partnership fails to comply with the regulatory safe 
harbors, the relevant allocation must be tested to determine whether it is in 
accordance with PIP. If it is not, it must be redone in accordance with PIP. 
PIP is thus the ultimate backstop of the Regulations—as well, of course, of 
section 704(b).
Given the backstop status of PIP, it may seem strange that Regulations 
contain relatively little detail on the calculation of PIP. Regulation section 
1.704-1(b)(3), which provides the core rules, states: 
15 See Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(b), -1(b)(2)(iii)(c).
16 See Reg. § 1.704-2. Regulation section 1.704-2(b)(1) states: “If [the safe harbor test for 
allocating nonrecourse deductions] is not satisfied, the partners’ distributive shares of nonre-
course deductions are determined under § 1.704-1(b)(3), according to the partners’ overall 
economic interests in the partnership.” 
17  Regulation section 1.704-1(b)(4)(ii) states: 
With respect to other tax credits, if a partnership expenditure (whether or not 
deductible) that gives rise to a tax credit in a partnership taxable year also gives rise to 
valid allocations of partnership loss or deduction (or other downward capital account 
adjustments) for such year, then the partners’ interests in the partnership with respect 
to such credit (or the cost giving rise thereto) shall be in the same proportion as such 
partners’ respective distributive shares of such loss or deduction (and adjustments).
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(i) In general.—References in section 704(b) and this paragraph to a part-
ner’s interest in the partnership, or to the partners’ interests in the partner-
ship, signify the manner in which the partners have agreed to share the 
economic benefit or burden (if any) corresponding to the income, gain, 
loss, deduction, or credit (or item thereof ) that is allocated. Except with 
respect to partnership items that cannot have economic effect (such as non-
recourse deductions of the partnership), this sharing arrangement may or 
may not correspond to the overall economic arrangement of the partners. 
Thus, a partner who has a 50 percent overall interest in the partnership may 
have a 90 percent interest in a particular item of income or deduction. (For 
example, in the case of an unexpected downward adjustment to the capital 
account of a partner who does not have a deficit make-up obligation that 
causes such partner to have a negative capital account, it may be necessary 
to allocate a disproportionate amount of gross income of the partnership to 
such partner for such year so as to bring that partner’s capital account back 
up to zero.) The determination of a partner’s interest in a partnership shall 
be made by taking into account all facts and circumstances relating to the 
economic arrangement of the partners.
(ii) Factors Considered. In determining a partner’s interest in the partnership, 
the following factors are among those that will be considered:
(a) The partners’ relative contributions to the partnership,
(b) The interests of the partners in economic profits and losses (if different 
than that in taxable income or loss),
(c) The interests of the partners in cash flow and other non-liquidating 
distributions, and
(d) The rights of the partners to distributions of capital upon liquidation 
(emphasis supplied).
Thus, outside of certain safe harbors that deem the partnership to allocate 
in accordance with PIP, PIP is determined under a facts and circumstances 
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test, with modest guidance from the Regulations,18 with one exception. The 
Regulations give specific guidance as to how to determine PIP where the allo-
cation meets the first two parts of the regular economic effect test but lacks 
an unlimited DRO—and would not meet any of the alternative tests.19 In 
this circumstance, the partners’ interests in the partnership are determined by 
comparing the manner in which distributions—and contributions—would 
be made if all partnership property were sold at book value and the partner-
ship were liquidated immediately following the end of the taxable year to 
which the allocation relates, with the manner in which distributions—and 
contributions—would be made if all partnership property were sold at book 
value and the partnership were liquidated immediately following the end of 
the prior taxable year, adjusted for certain items specified in the Regulations. 
This is sometimes called the “comparative liquidation test” and has limited 
real world value, though it was once litigated.20 That said, the specific guid-
ance does look at how the ultimate economic burdens are shared and aligns 
well with Regulation section 1.704-1(b)(3)(ii). To that extent, it is, if nothing 
else, a useful reminder, along with the listed PIP facts and circumstances, that 
bottom-line economics should be the focus.21
18 Willis, Postlewaite, and Alexander conclude that “[t]here is not a conflict between a 
partner’s interest in the partnership and substantial economic effect. They both rely on the 
same overriding principle that the tax effects of partnership operations must conform to the 
economic effects of those operations.” Arthur B. Willis et al., Partnership Taxation 
¶ 10.02[1] (8th ed. 2018). On the other hand, McKee, Nelson, and Whitmire caution that 
“it is far from clear that identical results would in fact be achieved under both the partner’s-
interest-in-the-partnership rule and the substantial economic effect safe harbor, and thus draft-
ers of partnership agreements who stray from the safe harbor do so at their peril.” William 
S. McKee et al., Federal Taxation of Partnerships and Partners ¶ 11.02[3] (4th ed. 
2007). 
The Regulations at one time contained a (fairly silly) rebuttable presumption that part-
ners have an equal interest in the partnership. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(3)(i) (1985) (stating that 
“[a]ll partners’ interests in the partnership are presumed to be equal (determined on a per 
capita basis)”). See Estate of Ballantyne v. Commissioner, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1896, 1904, 2002 
T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2002-160, at 1020; Barron v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1034, 1038, 
1992 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 92,598, at 3077. This tracked similarly silly presumptions under provi-
sions in the various versions of the Uniform Partnership Act. See Unif. P’ship Act (1997), 
§ 401(h) (amended 2013), 6 pt. II U.L.A. 85 (2015) (stating that “[e]ach partner has equal 
rights in the management and conduct of the partnership’s business”); Unif. P’ship Act 
(1997), § 401(f ), 6 pt. II U.L.A. 405 (2015) (same); Unif. P’ship Act (1914), § 18(e), 6 pt. 
III U.L.A. 410 (2015) (same). The regulatory presumption was removed in 2008.
19 Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(3)(iii).
20 The Tax Court upheld the Regulation in Interhotel Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 
819, 1997 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 97,449, vacated and remanded, 221 F.3d 1348 (9th Cir. 2000), on 
remand, 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1804, 2001 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2001-151. On remand, the court said 
that minimum gain, i.e., the amount by which nonrecourse debt exceeds a property’s book 
value, must be taken into account in computing the partners’ capital accounts when applying 
the comparative liquidation test. See Richard M. Lipton, A Lesson in Doing It the Hard Way: On 
Remand Tax Court Finds for Taxpayer in Interhotel, 95 J. Tax’n 69 (Aug. 2001). 
21 See Willis et al., supra note 18, at ¶¶ 10.02[1], 10.02[2].
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As the italicized language from the quoted portion of Regulation section 
1.704-1(b)(3) shows, PIP need not be the same for each item of partnership 
income and deduction. Thus, PIP is not the same as, for example, a partner’s 
average economic interest in the partnership. Instead, one must look at each 
relevant item of income and deduction and determine PIP for that item. 
Some have been troubled by the fact that PIP can vary in this fashion.22 While 
the Regulation’s definition of PIP is perhaps counter-intuitive at first blush, 
it makes perfect sense to those well-grounded in partnership taxation. The 
reality is that partnerships have the lawful ability to allocate different items 
of income and deductions differently to different partners. Thus, it often will 
not be possible to have a single PIP percentage for all partnership items. As 
I will discuss, somewhat surprisingly this issue turns out to play little role in 
the litigated cases, however.
Some have suggested that a partner’s individual tax circumstance could be 
a relevant PIP fact and circumstance.23 Likely, this confuses the substantiality 
rules of the substantial economic effect test with the PIP rules. As Example 
5 shows, a partner’s individual tax picture is a factor in determining whether 
or not the economic effect of an allocation is substantial.24 If, in light of that 
individual tax picture, the economic effect of the allocation is not substan-
tial, then the allocation must be redone in accordance with PIP. A partner’s 
personal tax picture should not, however, be relevant to the determination of 
PIP. In Example 5, the Regulations do not consider the partners’ individual 
tax picture in doing the reallocation but rather focus on the economics.25 
Further, all of the Regulations’ listed PIP factors focus on a partner’s eco-
nomic rights in the partnership, i.e., the economic relationship between the 
partner and the partnership. A partner’s individual tax picture plays no role in 
that regard and should not be relevant in determining PIP.
F. Does PIP Rule the Roost?  
Given that the substantial economic effect rules constitute a safe harbor, 
one might expect that practitioners would try to comply with them whenever 
possible rather than trying to come within the ill-defined PIP rules. While I 
am aware of no hard data on this point, my sense from attending ABA Tax 
Section meetings for over 30 years is that there was a time when practitioners 
did give priority to complying with the safe harbor, but over the years this has 
changed.26 Practitioners increasingly have intentionally violated the substan-
tial economic effect rules and gambled that their clients’ allocations would be 
in accordance with PIP. There are doubtless many reasons for this, some very 
22 See Utz, supra note 1, at 366.
23 Id. at 367.
24 See supra text accompanying notes 11–12; see also Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(5), Ex. (6).
25 See Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(5), Ex. (5)(ii).
26 See also Carman, supra note 1, at 214; Lipton et al., supra note 5, at § 5.04A (acknowl-
edging this reality). A liquidating distribution that does not match the capital account balance 
likely would give the partner a gain or loss on the liquidating distribution under section 731.
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fact specific. Many are gambling that the partnership will not be audited. But 
a repeated concern is that it can be difficult to comply with the safe harbor, 
even when acting in good faith.
1.  Target Allocations
The “target allocation method” is perhaps the most common alternative 
to the substantial economic effect rules. Typically, this method violates the 
substantial economic effect rules but is believed to accord with PIP. Again, 
at the risk of oversimplifying, a target allocation focuses on how much cash 
a partner should receive at a given point in time—perhaps simulating a 
liquidation—and then attempts to allocate income or loss to the partner’s 
capital account so that it equals the cash the partner should receive. The tar-
get allocation approach violates the Regulations’ rules on capital accounts 
because distributions effectively govern capital accounts balances. Under the 
substantial economic effect rules, it is just the opposite. One determines a 
partner’s capital account under the rules, and the partner then is entitled 
to a distribution equal to that balance. Also, in a partnership liquidation, a 
target allocation agreement often provides that the partner receives a stated 
amount of cash even if the partnership has insufficient income or loss to 
make his capital account match the distribution, which would also violate 
the Regulations’ capital account rules—and would also generate a gain or loss 
to the distributee partner on the liquidating, cash distribution under section 
731.27 Of course, violating the capital account rules means violating the sub-
stantial economic effect test. 
Many believe that because the target allocation method causes the alloca-
tion to “follow the cash,” one is more likely to get to the right result and less 
likely to make a drafting error. As deals get more complex with “waterfalls” 
(i.e., different classes of partners receive allocations and distributions in dif-
ferent orders) and flips (e.g., increased allocation to the managing partners 
when certain goals are met), the risk of a drafting error is no small thing. 
Often, though not always, the parties could get to the same result using the 
substantial economic effect test but prefer to avoid the drafting challenges 
27 See Daniel S. Goldberg, The Target Method for Partnership Special Allocations and Why It 
Should Be Safe-Harbored, 69 Tax Law. 663 (2016); William G. Cavanagh, Targeted Alloca-
tions Hit the Spot, 129 Tax Notes (TA) 89 (Oct. 4, 2010); Todd D. Golub, Target Allocations: 
The Swiss Army Knife of Drafting (Good for Most Situations—But Don’t Bet Your Life on It), 87 
Taxes 157 (Mar. 2009); Terence Floyd Cuff, Working with Target Allocations—Idiot-Proofing or 
Drafting for Idiots?, 35 Real Est. Tax’n 116 (No. 3, 2008); Terence Floyd Cuff, Some Selected 
Issues in Drafting Real Estate Partnership and LLC Agreements, in Prac. L. Inst.: The Corp. 
Tax Practice Series: Tax Strategies for Corporate Acquisitions, Dispositions, Spin-
Offs, Joint Ventures, Financing, Reorganizations & Restructurings ch. 52 (Louis S. 
Freeman ed., 2007); Robert L. Whitmire et al., Structuring and Drafting Partnership 
Agreements: Including LLC Agreements ¶ 5.05[2] (3d ed. 2003). Some partnership agree-
ments that wish to comply with the substantial economic effect test contain “savings clauses” 
designed to address circumstances such as these. These savings clauses can create problems of 
their own. See Goldberg, supra, at 715–16.
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involved. In the typical case, target allocations are not being used to game the 
tax system but are instead being used to allow the partners to reach the cor-
rect economic result more safely than using the substantial economic effect 
safe harbor.
2.  Is More Better?
A consistent concern expressed about the PIP regulations is their inher-
ent uncertainty28—aside from the noted exception.29 One cannot know with 
complete confidence whether a given allocation that fails the substantial 
economic effect test will qualify under PIP. In the current formulation, this 
uncertainty is unavoidable. The Regulations spend less than 100 words on 
relevant PIP facts and circumstances. As I hope to show, there would be little 
value in lengthening the list of relevant facts and circumstances or creating a 
more complex PIP regime or both.
III.  PIP in the Regulatory Examples
There are relatively few examples in the Regulations that state how real-
location in accordance with PIP should occur. When the Regulations do so, 
the reallocation is done in a way that offers little guidance outside of the four 
corners of the example. The examples typically involve partnerships with two 
partners where it is a straight-forward matter to figure out PIP. In Example 
5, discussed above,30 the partners were equal in all respects outside of the 
attempted allocation. One might assume that on reallocation in accordance 
with PIP the taxable and tax-exempt income must be allocated equally. The 
Regulations, though, look at the percentage of total income—taxable and 
not—actually allocated to each partner under the agreement and then allo-
cate that percentage of each kind of income to each partner. The Regulations 
do not try to change the partners’ deal—which a 50–50 PIP allocation would 
have done—and instead keep the amount of income allocated to each partner 
the same as in the original agreement but change the tax consequences by 
allocating the taxable and tax-exempt income proportionately. 
Some have questioned this approach.31 Their argument is that if the part-
ners had known the allocation would not have been respected, they would 
have allocated everything 50–50, but because they, in fact, did not receive a 
50–50 share, there has been a taxable transfer from the high-tax partner to 
the low-tax partner. While not without some theoretical cogency—at least 
for those residing in the ivory tower—Treasury and the Service probably lack 
the authority to create a taxable transfer between the partners when none 
actually occurred. Further, creating taxable transfers between partners out of 
28 See sources cited, supra note 1; Lokken, supra note 4.
29 See supra text accompanying notes 19–20.
30 See supra text accompanying notes 11–12.
31 See David Hasen, Partnership Special Allocations Revisited, 13 Fla. Tax Rev. 349, 377–82 
(2012); Gregg D. Polsky, Deterring Tax-Driven Partnership Allocations, 64 Tax Law. 97, 114–
16 (2010).
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whole cloth as part of a PIP reallocation would wreak havoc in more complex 
fact patterns such as those with waterfalls and preferred returns on capital. 
What if, for example, a section 754 election were in effect. How would that 
be accounted for? 
The Service’s more straight-forward approach works better in the real 
world. Further, as others have noted, it builds in a penalty. By failing to create 
an allocation with substantial economic effect, the partners are placed in a 
different position—and in the case of the higher taxed partner a worse one—
than if they played by the rules.32 If partners could go back to their baseline 
structure, in the example 50–50, and if the allocations do not hold up, they 
are in a win-win situation. If the allocations survive scrutiny, they have a tax 
advantage; if not, they are not worse off than if they had never made the 
attempt. By forcing the partners to stick with the economic consequences 
they created, but not the tax consequences, the Regulations are putting the 
partners in a win-lose situation, perhaps encouraging them to restrain their 
wilder allocation urges.
Another typical example is Example 4 which involves a two-person partner-
ship in which the contributions to the partnership were made 75%–25%.33 
The partnership agreement also provided that distributions would be 75%–
25%—and thus, contrary to the economic effect test, not in accordance 
with capital account balances. The partnership agreement provided that all 
income and deduction would be allocated 50%–50%. Since that allocation 
lacked economic effect, it had to be redone in accordance with PIP, which 
the example—of course—states would be 75%–25%. Other examples that 
make the PIP calculation are similar.34 In real life, PIP is often anything but 
obvious, though in the litigated cases, discussed below, PIP is usually fairly 
easy to identify.
IV.  Case Law
There is hardly a plethora of cases on PIP, but there have been some. I 
discuss most of these next. The years at issue in many of the cases predate 
the adoption of the relevant Regulations in 1985.35 The courts in these cases, 
however, essentially applied the equivalent of the regulatory rules. Indeed, 
the Regulations to a large extent adopted the analysis of prior case law, which 
32 See Polsky, supra note 31, at 115–16.
33 Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(5), Ex. (4).
34 See, e.g., Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(5), Exs. (6)–(8), (10). There are other examples in which the 
Regulations conclude that an allocation lacks substantial economic effect and must be reallo-
cated in accordance with PIP but don’t actually calculate PIP. Notably, these examples tend to 
be more complex. See Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(5), Exs. (9), (16). 
35 Though the Regulations were retroactive to tax years beginning after December 31, 1975. 
See T.D. 8095, 1986-1 C.B. 254, 255.
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looked at substantial economic effect, capital accounts, DROs, and PIP.36 
Accordingly, in the discussion, I don’t make a point of distinguishing between 
pre-1985 and post-1985 tax years that are under discussion.
A.  Hogan v. Commissioner
Hogan v. Commissioner is one of the first cases to address PIP.37 Honey Hill 
Farm Partnership was formed in Pennsylvania in 1973 to breed and show 
quarter horses. It had three partners, Joseph Hogan, Frederick DeClement, 
and William Hogan. The partnership operated at a loss, and Joseph, the liti-
gating taxpayer, claimed that he was entitled to two-thirds of the losses. He did 
make larger capital contributions than Frederick. William, Joseph’s brother, 
did not make any capital contributions but contributed services instead. He 
was charged with managing the daily operations of the business. The partners 
did not have a written agreement but orally agreed that profits would be allo-
cated one-third to each partner; whereas, losses would be allocated two-thirds 
to Joseph and one-third to Frederick. The terms of the partners’ oral agree-
ment likely would have been effective if they had executed a written partner-
ship agreement that complied with the substantial economic effect rules. The 
partners did properly maintain capital accounts, and Joseph had a negative 
capital account. The partners were unable to prove, however, that there was 
any oral or written agreement under which a partner was obligated to restore 
a deficit capital account balance on liquidation of the partnership.
Interestingly, the partners tried to argue, not without some cogency, that 
state law required a partner to restore a deficit capital account. Pennsylvania 
followed section 18(a) of the 1914 Uniform Partnership Act, which provided 
that 
[e]ach partner shall be repaid his contributions, whether by way of capital 
or advances to the partnership property and share equally in the profits 
and surplus remaining after all liabilities, including those to partners, are 
satisfied; and must contribute towards the losses, whether of capital or oth-
erwise, sustained by the partnership according to his share in the profits.38 
36 See Hogan v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 870, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 90,295 (1990); 
Ogden v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 871, 881–84 (1985), aff’d per curiam, 788 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 
1986); Gershkowitz v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 984, 1017–19 (1987); Elrod v. Commissioner, 
87 T.C. 1046, 1082–86 (1986); Goldfine v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 843, 852 (1983).
37 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 870, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 90,295 (1990). But it is not the first. There are 
several earlier cases that I do not discuss due to the minor role that the PIP issue played or 
because I felt the cases were too long in the tooth. See generally Orrisch v. Commissioner, 55 
T.C. 395 (1970); Harris v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 770 (1974); Allison v. United States, 701 
F.2d 933 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Hamilton v. United States, 687 F.2d 408 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Goldfine, 
80 T.C. 843; Miller v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 409, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 84,336 (1984); 
Schumaker v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 85,582 (1985); Mam-
moth Lake Project v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 1630, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 91,004 (1991).
38 Unif. P’ship Act (1914), § 18(a), 6 pt. III U.L.A. 410 (2015). 
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But the Tax Court had previously ruled in Goldfine39 that similar language 
in an Illinois statute did not create a DRO. While Joseph’s argument was not 
specious, neither was the court’s analysis. Although the Pennsylvania statue 
was hardly a model of clarity, it was not inevitable that a partner’s obliga-
tion to “contribute towards the losses” was synonymous with a DRO. Losses, 
for example, could be interpreted to mean any debts owed to creditors at 
the time of the liquidation. If none were owed, no payment by a partner 
might be due. Further, the unspecific nature of the statue makes it difficult 
to align it with the substantial economic effect Regulations. Finally, the court 
may not have been unduly sympathetic, inasmuch as the partners could have 
created a written agreement that would have unambiguously complied with 
the Regulations.
Given the lack of compliance with the substantial economic effect test, 
the court relied on PIP; and Joseph’s battle was lost. The partners’ own testi-
mony made it clear that they generally regarded themselves as equal partners, 
and, accordingly, the court required equal allocations. Ultimately, the case 
really hinged on the interpretation of the state partnership statute. If the Tax 
Court was correct in this regard, then its holding is unassailable. And the Tax 
Court’s holding with regard to the statute, while perhaps not inescapable, was 
a fair one. It was reasonable to conclude that an ambiguous statute did not 
comply with the terms of an unambiguous—with respect to the economic 
effect test—Regulation.
B.  PNRC Limited Partnership v. Commissioner
The facts in PNRC LP v. Commissioner are complex, though the underly-
ing issue is reasonably straight forward.40 Peter Carlino was the sole limited 
partner of PNRC Limited Partnership (PNRC LP). A corporation, PNRC, 
was the general partner. PNRC was, in turn, controlled by the Carlino 
Family Partnership (CFP), another limited partnership controlled by Carlino 
and his family. Carlino was the general partner of CFP. The limited part-
ners were his wife and children. Carlino successfully ran several race track 
businesses. Carlino had leased the Penn National Race Course through an 
entity, Mountainview Thoroughbred Racing Association (Mountainview), 
which he controlled. The race track was profitable to Mountainview. Because 
Mountainview was not allowed to renew its lease, in 1982 CFP and the 
newly formed PNRC LP entered into a contract to buy the race track, which 
included the assumption of an existing $8 million mortgage. That mortgage 
was also guaranteed by Carlino, his wife, and entities he controlled—includ-
ing PNRC and Mountainview. CFP and PNRC LP in turn leased the race 
track to Mountainview and the Turf Club; at the time, Turf Club was a public 
corporation. The opinion did not state what the sharing arrangement was 
between CFP and PNRC LP.
39 Goldfine, 80 T.C. at 852–53.
40 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 265, 1993 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 93,335.
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The PNRC LP partnership agreement (the Agreement) initially allocated 
losses 1% to the general partner, PNRC, and 99% to the limited partner, 
Carlino. The original Agreement inversely allocated profits 99% to the gen-
eral partner and 1% to the limited partner. But the Agreement was amended 
three days after it was executed, on December 31, 1982, to provide for an 
allocation of 60% of any profits to the general partner and 40% to the lim-
ited partner. The Agreement did not reflect the parties’ capital contributions, 
but the partnership was capitalized with $420,000. The Agreement further 
provided that upon termination of the partnership, the general partner was to 
either sell the partnership’s assets and distribute the net proceeds or distribute 
the partnership’s property to the partners in proportion to their percentage 
interests. The Agreement provided that any reference to a partner’s percentage 
interest was to his interest in net profits. PNRC LP sustained losses in all of 
the years at issue.
The Tax Court concluded that the allocations in the limited partnership 
agreement lacked economic effect because the partnership agreement did not 
contain any of the “regular” economic effect provisions and, indeed, specifi-
cally provided that the general partner was not obligated to restore a negative 
capital account. The agreement did not meet any of the alternate regula-
tory tests. Carlino apparently tried to argue that his guarantee of the $8 mil-
lion debt constituted a DRO, but the court rejected this argument because 
Carlino was, of course, not unqualifiedly obligated to pay on the guarantee. 
Payment would only have needed to be made if the primary obligor was 
insolvent—which was not the case—and other guarantors did not pay—
which was unknowable in the abstract.
Accordingly, the partnership losses had to be reallocated in accordance with 
PIP. The court felt that the contributions to the partnership were most indica-
tive of PIP and reallocated the losses in accordance with those contributions. 
This resulted in PNRC being allocated approximately 71% of the losses in 
the first two years under consideration and approximately 39% for the final 
two years, with the balance being allocated to Carlino. I will spare the reader 
the complexities of the court’s math. Note that the losses allocated to PNRC, 
apparently a C corporation, would have been useless in the near term because 
PNRC would not have had any income to offset them.
This is not the only case I will discuss in which the attorney advising the 
taxpayer did not seem to be paying attention to relevant tax law. It is hard to 
argue with the court’s choice to base its allocations on the partners’ contri-
butions because the contributions were the only truly available and relevant 
fact. The other factors listed in the Regulations did not apply. The interests 
of the partners in economic profits and losses were not different from those 
in taxable income or loss, and there were apparently no identifiable rights to 
cash flow and other nonliquidating distributions. It did not make much sense 
to use liquidation rights for a partnership not contemplating liquidation that 
had operated exclusively at a loss and had substantial debt. It might have 
nothing to distribute in liquidation. And there were no other facts on which 
534 SECTION OF TAXATION
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 72, No. 2
the court could hang its hat. So, whatever the regulatory paucity, the court 
likely reached the right answer. Note that here the court was focused on PIP 
for losses. Since PIP can be different for different items, had the court been 
in a position to allocate net partnership income, it may not have reached the 
same answer.
C. Vecchio v. Commissioner
It is not entirely clear why Vecchio v. Commissioner is a regular Tax Court 
decision, rather than a memorandum decision.41 In light of the cases dis-
cussed above, Vecchio did not break new ground. The PIP rules were triggered 
because the allocations in the partnership agreement did not have substantial 
economic effect. The facts of the case are complex, involving partner changes, 
disputes among the partners, two Ohio state court judgments that overrode, 
in parts, the partnership agreement, and revisions by the Service of its assess-
ment during the litigation. I will focus on the basics. Sam J. Vecchio, Equity 
Johanna (a limited partnership), and Lawrence Berzon were partners in a part-
nership, the main asset of which was a commercial building. The partnership 
agreement allocated operating income 47.5% to Vecchio, 49% to Equity, and 
3.5% to Berzon. The partnership agreement allocated a disproportionately 
large share of losses and depreciation to Equity from 1974 through 1978, so 
that at the beginning of 1980, Equity had a negative capital account balance 
of $1,251,898. Vecchio and Berzon had positive capital account balances.
As a result of a dispute between Equity and Vecchio as to whether to retain 
or distribute profits, Equity filed suit in an Ohio court. On May 8, 1980, the 
state court ordered Vecchio to purchase Equity’s interest in the partnership 
on or before September 30, 1981, or to transfer one-half of his interest in the 
partnership to Equity. Apparently prompted by the state court’s judgment, the 
partnership sold its real property on December 10, 1980, on the installment 
basis.42 Equity argued that it was entitled to be paid out of the first install-
ment proceeds. Vecchio refused that payment, resulting in a second round 
of state-court litigation. The Ohio court concluded that the sale terminated 
the partnership and advanced the date for implementation of the court’s first 
order. The state court ordered Vecchio to pay the balance of the purchase 
price to Equity for its partnership interest, after making certain adjustments.
The partnership agreement provided that, upon the sale of the partnership’s 
real property or the liquidation of the partnership, Equity was entitled to a 
return of its capital investment of $766,100 before distributions were made to 
other partners. The partnership realized gain of $4,659,832 on the sale of the 
real property, of which $1,986,913 was recognized—i.e., taxable—in 1980 
under section 453. The partnership partially double-allocated the gain, first 
allocating all of the realized gain to the partners and then also allocating the 
1980 recognized gain to the partners. Of course, a double allocation cannot 
41 103 T.C. 170 (1994).
42 See I.R.C. § 453.
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stand. It is not clear from the Tax Court opinion whether the partnership 
agreement—as amended by the state court order—required this outcome or 
whether the partnership merely made a mistake in its allocations. The Tax 
Court apparently took the view that the allocations that the partnership made 
were pursuant to the partnership agreement. Given other problems with the 
partnership agreement, the outcome of the case would have been the same 
regardless of how the Tax Court interpreted the allocation provisions of the 
agreement in this regard.
The Tax Court concluded that the partnership agreement failed to comply 
with the economic effect test. In the court’s—doubtless correct—view, all of 
the partnership’s book gain, that is all of the gain realized on the sale, had to 
be reflected in the partners’ capital accounts in the year of the sale. But the 
capital accounts could, of course, not again be adjusted for the 1980 gain that 
was taxable under the rules of section 453. The double allocation of the 1980 
gain meant, of course, that the partnership failed to keep capital accounts in 
accordance with the regulations, which meant that the partnership’s alloca-
tions did not comply with the first part of the economic effect test. As noted 
above, the partnership agreement also provided that Equity was to receive 
a return of its investment before the other partners received a distribution. 
But the second part of the economic effect test requires that all partners be 
paid the positive balance in their capital accounts, with no preference for 
any partner with a positive capital account balance. Consequently, the part-
nership agreement failed to comply with the second part of the economic 
effect test. Finally, the partnership agreement did not require the partners 
with negative capital account balances to restore the deficit on liquidation 
of the partnership, thereby failing the third part of the economic effect test. 
Thus, the partnership failed all three parts of the economic effect test. Again, 
one wonders why the practitioners drawing up the agreement were not pay-
ing more attention.43
Since the partnership agreement failed the economic effect test, the alloca-
tions had to be redetermined in accordance with PIP. It is conceivable that the 
Tax Court and the Service could have attacked the prior years’ allocations to 
Equity which presumably also lacked economic effect—indeed, as I discuss 
below, that would have been preferable—but both the Tax Court and the 
Service focused on 1980. The court concluded that, because Equity had a 
negative capital account, gain had to first be allocated to Equity’s interest in 
an amount necessary to bring its capital account to zero to avoid shifting the 
“burden” of the prior years’ losses that had been deducted by Equity to the 
other partners. The court’s language here is awkward, though the allocation in 
context is correct. An allocation of income to a capital account cannot really 
43 Although the tax years at issue preceded the adoption of the substantial economic effect 
Regulations in 1985, the baseline rules had by that time been established by case law. In 
this case, the court cited the Regulations, which were retroactive to tax years beginning after 
December 31, 1975. See supra note 35. 
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be seen as a burden. To the extent mirrored by taxable income, a tax may be 
due, but the partner receiving the allocation has a bigger capital account and 
more money in his pocket on liquidation, assuming he receives a distribu-
tion of the balance in his capital account on liquidation. That said, it made 
sense to make this allocation to Equity because of its preferential $766,100 
liquidation rights and its lack of a DRO. To permit such a distribution on 
liquidation, Equity’s capital account had to reflect a positive $766,100 bal-
ance, and the first step in achieving this result was to restore the deficit in the 
capital account. The court then allocated additional gain to Equity to bring 
its capital account to $766,100. The total of those two allocations to Equity, 
$2,176,332, was less than the realized gain of $4,659,832, but exceeded 
the taxable gain in the year of the sale of $1,986,913. The court concluded 
that, consequently, Equity had to receive all of the taxable gain as part of its 
$2,176,332 allocation.44
It has been argued that PIP in the case should have been determined by 
using the comparative liquidation test.45 That Regulation only applies, how-
ever, if the partnership complies with all but the last of the three economic 
effect tests. In Vecchio, the court concluded that the partnership failed all 
three economic effect tests.
If one accepts the Tax Court’s implied premise that the only tax year at 
issue was 1980, then the court’s PIP allocation seems fair enough. It made 
allocations of income to Equity in an amount that assured that its capital 
account was sufficient to cover its bottom-line distribution rights. Indeed, if 
1980 is the only relevant year, it is hard to see how the court could have made 
an alternative allocation. The court’s allocation, incidentally, aligns rather 
nicely with the target allocation system. The allocation resulted in an adjust-
ment of Equity’s capital account to accord with Equity’s distribution rights 
on liquidation.
But, the difficulty with the opinion is the focus on 1980. If the allocations 
to Equity lacked economic effect in 1980, they also lacked economic effect in 
the prior years since the partnership agreement was unchanged. Thus, what 
the court needed to do was to recalculate the allocation for all relevant years, 
though only open years could have changed the taxes due. Given that Equity 
did not have a DRO, Equity should not, at a minimum, have been given 
allocations of losses that caused its capital account to go negative, and those 
allocations should have been given to the other partners. PIP, though, would 
44 If everything else had been equal, the balance of the realized gain would have been allo-
cated to the other partners. But because Vecchio purchased Equity’s interest, the Tax Court had 
to address the extent to which a portion of Equity’s gain was shifted to Vecchio due to the sale. 
The Service claimed that Vecchio purchased the interest before the sale of the real property, but 
the court rejected that claim and held that Vecchio acquired the interest after the sale of the real 
property. The court, however, held that Vecchio’s purchase of the partnership interest brought 
with it Equity’s right to the first $766,100, causing some of the gain associated with Equity’s 
interest to be shifted to Vecchio under section 706. 
45 See Utz, supra note 1, at 378.
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have given Equity a positive capital account balance of $766,100, since it had 
a right to receive that amount before distributions to the other partners were 
made. Thus, the court’s approach was correct in giving Equity a positive capi-
tal account balance of $766,100 but also wrong by effectively allowing prior 
years’ allocations to stand when those allocations did not have substantial 
economic effect. Vecchio is thus something of a mixed bag as a precedent. It 
misapplied the law in important ways but was right to focus on requiring that 
Equity’s capital account align with the parties’ economic agreement.
If one assumes that the statute of limitation had expired on the prior years, 
however, it was more equitable to give Equity the income allocation given 
that it received the benefit of losses in prior years and had a capital account 
deficit that needed to be offset. To the extent that equitable considerations are 
a PIP factor, and why not, then in this circumstance the court’s allocations 
were sound.
D.  Brooks v. Commissioner
Getting shafted by your fellow partners, apparently, does not affect PIP. In 
Brooks v. Commissioner, there was no formal partnership agreement, but the 
taxpayer stipulated that she held a 25% interest in the partnership, resolv-
ing the PIP question.46 She claimed, however, that she should not be taxable 
on the income because she had received no distributions. The argument, as 
one would expect, fell on deaf ears. Partners are, of course, taxable on their 
allocable shares of the partnership’s income under section 702 whether or not 
the partnership makes distributions. Indeed, even fraud has been held not to 
relieve a taxpayer of tax liability.47 The important point here is that disputes 
among partners that go to the operation of the partnership rather than the 
measure of their economic interests, do not—unsurprisingly—affect PIP.
E. Estate of Tobias v. Commissioner
Estate of Tobias v. Commissioner is yet another case with complex facts and 
ill-advised taxpayers.48 Two brothers, James and Darwin, had an oral partner-
ship to operate a farm and did not have a specific agreement as to allocations. 
They both had independent means and did not have any specific agreements 
as to who would do what. James did most of the work. They both made 
land they owned available to the partnership and agreed that both would be 
paid rent for the use of the land. While the rent was often paid to Darwin, 
James apparently often deferred being paid. Both brothers were reimbursed 
for expenses, but otherwise the partnership did not make distributions to 
them. All profits were reinvested in the business. In 1986, the brothers had a 
46 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 458, 1995 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 95,400.
47 Stoumen v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 903, 906 (3d Cir. 1953); Stern v. Commissioner, 48 
T.C.M. (CCH) 605, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 84,383 (1984).
48 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1163, 2001 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2001-037.
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falling out, and James prevented Darwin from participating in the business. 
James continued to operate the farm through at least 1993. 
In 1986, Darwin sued James and requested dissolution of the partnership. 
The state court found that Darwin had been “wrongfully excluded from the 
business” and was entitled to dissolution of the partnership and an account-
ing. The state court found that James’ contributions to the partnership far 
exceeded Darwin’s contributions and concluded that under Pennsylvania 
law “repayment of capital investments before distribution of any profits is 
an essential element of every partnerships [sic] agreement implied as a term 
of law.”49 The court ordered that each partner be repaid his capital contribu-
tions and that thereafter any profits be divided equally. Before the court’s 
order could be brought to closure, James died. In litigation that took place 
after James’ death, the state court determined that James had made capital 
contributions to the partnership of $1,001,558.60, that Darwin had made 
capital contributions to the partnership of $2,320, and that the partnership 
had $23,311.87 in its bank accounts. The state court ordered payment of 
the outstanding liabilities of the partnership totaling $23,335.47. The state 
court also ordered the sale of partnership equipment at a public auction, with 
any funds remaining after payment to creditors to be distributed to James’ 
estate to repay him for his contribution. The state court did not order any 
distributions to Darwin, apparently on the assumption that any partnership 
distributions that could be made would be insufficient to reimburse James for 
his contributions to the partnership.
Just to complicate things, from 1965 until 1992, James treated the farm 
business as a sole proprietorship and reported the entire income from the 
business on his individual tax returns. After the state court found that the 
business was a partnership, James caused the partnership to file returns for 
the years 1990 through 1993. Darwin did not participate in the preparation 
or filing of the partnership returns. The returns reported the two brothers as 
equal partners, and James reported half the income on his personal returns.50
The Service’s response was, at first blush, perplexing. It claimed that it 
could not reliably determine what each partner’s share of income was and so 
allocated 100% of the income to James and 50% of the income to Darwin—
who had reported none of it—for a total of 150%. That obviously could 
not stand. The Service’s assessment against Darwin was not as irrational as it 
seems or particularly unusual. The assessment against Darwin was protective 
in nature, in case the Service lost the argument that James should be allocated 
all of the income. If the Service had just proceeded against James and lost, 
the statute of limitations for a claim against Darwin might have expired in 
the interim. Further, all of the relevant parties were before the court, so a 
49 Estate of Tobias, 81 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1170, 2001 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2001-037 at 276 (quot-
ing from the state court’s opinion in Tobias v. Tobias, No. 4583 (Ct. C.P. Dauphin County, 
Pa. July 7, 1992)).
50 Excluding, inexplicably, capital gains in 1993.
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complete resolution, one way or the other, could be had in one litigation. The 
Service generously said that it would reduce Darwin’s assessment to the extent 
it was successful in its claim against James.
Before the Tax Court, James’ estate claimed that James should only be 
taxed on 50%, while Darwin claimed that, because there was no partnership, 
all of the income should be taxed to James, noting the state court’s conclusion 
that all distributions should go to James. The Service essentially agreed with 
Darwin, arguing that James had a 100% PIP interest—apparently unboth-
ered by the idea of a one-person partnership. The Service also argued that 
the partnership agreement did not provide for an allocation, which, as dis-
cussed above, is grounds for using PIP. The court agreed with the Service in 
this regard.
There was an important, albeit somewhat paradoxical, set of issues in the 
case. On one hand, Darwin had no role and seemingly no economic rights 
in the partnership for the years at issue, 1990 to 1993. Darwin could only 
receive a distribution after the partners had been repaid their capital contri-
butions, but because James’ capital contribution could not be fully repaid, 
there was no way for Darwin’s share to be triggered. As a result of the state 
court’s holding, Darwin thus had no effective rights to cash flow, nonliq-
uidating, or liquidating distributions. On the other hand, the partnership 
remained in existence because, as the Tax Court observed, nothing in section 
708 triggered a liquidation of the partnership for the years in question. The 
court concluded that “[i]t is evident, therefore, that during each of the years 
in issue James bore the economic benefit of 100 percent of the income real-
ized by the partnership.”51 Inescapably, the court affirmed the Service’s assess-
ment against James.
Given that PIP focuses on a partner’s economic rights, and James effectively 
held all of the economic rights in the partnership, it is hard to argue with the 
Tax Court’s holding. One commentator has argued that since Darwin had a 
50% profits interest, he should have been allocated 50% of the income for 
the years in question,52 but this elevates form over substance. In light of the 
state court’s holding, Darwin was never going to collect that profit share. 
There is some question of whether the state court pristinely followed the 
terms of the Uniform Partnership Act,53 but it is not the Tax Court’s job to 
relitigate an effective state court decision. Rather it is the Tax Court’s job to 
apply tax law in light of the partners’ rights under state law.
F.  Ballantyne v. Commissioner
In Ballantyne v. Commissioner, Melvin Ballantyne and Russell Ballantyne 
were brothers.54 In 1943, they formed a general partnership known as 
51 Estate of Tobias, 81 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1170, 2001 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2001-037 at 275. 
52 See Utz, supra note 1, at 375.
53 Id.
54 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1896, 2002 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2002-160.
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Ballantyne Brothers Partnership (BBP). A written partnership agreement 
was never executed. The partnership was involved in two separate businesses. 
Russell primarily conducted a farming activity in North Dakota. Melvin 
primarily conducted an oil and gas exploration and production activity in 
Canada and various U.S. locations. In general, the brothers agreed that each 
brother could withdraw from the partnership the profits attributable to 
the activity he conducted. Melvin and Russell each also generally paid the 
expenses related to his respective activity. Many of the assets used by BBP in 
its activities were not held in the partnership’s name but rather were owned 
by either Melvin and Russell jointly or one of them individually. Melvin died 
in 1994, and the partnership automatically dissolved upon his death. From 
1980 to 1994, the partnership filed partnership returns showing the two 
brothers as equal partners. Yet again, the partnership kept poor records and 
did not maintain capital accounts.
After Melvin’s death, his wife Jean, executrix of his estate, filed suit against 
Russell for an accounting of the assets and liabilities of BBP in order to estab-
lish the value of BBP’s assets and liabilities and the respective interests of 
Melvin and Russell as of the date of Melvin’s death. The estate alleged that 
it had not received a distribution from the farming operations Russell con-
ducted and claimed that Russell had embezzled cash from BBP bank accounts 
and transferred it to his own business and personal accounts, resulting in 
a casualty or theft loss of $560,900. In 1998, the litigation was settled in 
exchange for a $2 million payment by Russell to the estate and an agreement 
for property division. The parties stipulated that all grain, and any proceeds 
from the sale thereof, held on or after November 1993 in the name of BBP 
were to be the sole property of Russell. They also stipulated that all assets and 
liabilities of BBP held on or after March 4, 1994, would be the sole property 
of Russell.
The Service issued a notice of deficiency on various matters. The one rel-
evant here was a claim that Russell failed to report $751,988 of income from 
grain sales in 1994. That claim would fail if Melvin and Russell were 50–50 
partners during the time the income was earned but succeed if Russell was 
the sole owner of the grain business. The estate disputed that it should be 
allocated any share of the income from grain sales. 
The court noted that, a state court judgment notwithstanding, taxpayers 
cannot retroactively change tax consequences. It was clear that BBP owned the 
grain in 1994, not Russell individually, and that any resulting income from its 
sale was income of the partnership. Since the partnership agreement was oral, 
the partnership could not meet the economic effect test, which ultimately 
meant that the income had to be allocated according to PIP.55 The court 
noted, but did not place special emphasis on the fact, that the Regulations at 
the time contained a rebuttable presumption that partners had equal interests 
55 The court also concluded that the partnership did not meet the economic effect equiva-
lency test. 
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in the partnership.56 The partnership tax returns showed the brothers to be 
equal partners. Several witnesses testified that they believed the brothers to 
be equal partners. When the estate negotiated a settlement, its objective was 
to obtain 50% of the partnership’s assets, and the evidence indicated that this 
objective was achieved. Neither brother was ever heard to complain about the 
50–50 arrangement. The only contrary fact related to how the partners with-
drew money from the partnership. Apparently, each brother could withdraw 
money as he wished, and, as noted above, each typically withdrew the funds 
from the business he conducted. There was evidence that Melvin withdrew 
more funds from the partnership than Russell. But this fact was, in the court’s 
view, insufficient to outweigh all of the other evidence that favored a 50–50 
partnership, particularly since there was no legal impediment to prevent one 
partner from withdrawing funds from the other partner’s business.
Again, it is hard to fault the court’s conclusion. While the court mentioned 
the former regulatory presumption of equal partners more than once in the 
case, it is not clear how large a role that presumption played. But, given the 
evidence, it is hard to see how the court could have reached a different con-
clusion had there been no such presumption.57 The overwhelming weight of 
the evidence was that Melvin and Russell were equal partners.
G.  Holdner v. Commissioner
In Holdner v. Commissioner, son and father formed a partnership to manage 
a cattle farm in 1977.58 The son was responsible for managing the farm; his 
duties included feeding the cattle, maintaining farm equipment, and tending 
to sick animals. The father was primarily responsible for managing the farm’s 
financial affairs; his duties included arranging cattle sales, making payments 
to suppliers, and obtaining financing to purchase new farm properties. The 
son worked full time, and the father, who was also an accountant, worked 
about half time in the farming business. The father also agreed, at least ini-
tially, to contribute money to the farm, though it was unclear how much 
money he actually contributed or whether he expected to be repaid. They 
agreed that the son would be entitled to one-half of the farm’s gross pro-
ceeds from cattle sales and that he would have an equity interest in the farm, 
though the precise nature of that interest was unclear. There was no credible 
evidence that the father and son had an agreement on the allocation of other 
items of income and expense.
The father believed that it was important to the success of the farm to 
also own income producing properties. Father and son jointly bought several 
properties using land sale contacts, with payments on the contract made from 
56 See supra note 18.
57 Had Russell truly embezzled funds from the partnership, that might have shifted a por-
tion of what would otherwise have been Melvin’s income to him, but the court concluded that 
the evidence did not support the embezzlement claim.
58 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 108, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010-175.
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income generated by the properties. These properties, including pasture, 
timberland, and even another farm, were fully paid for by 2004 and were 
owned by the father and son as tenants in common. Notwithstanding the 
title, the understanding was that the son would inherit the properties on the 
father’s death. The cattle business proved successful, generating $1,000,000 
of income from 2004 to 2006, the years under review. The other properties 
were also profitable, earning about $284,000 during the same time frame.
The partnership had a separate bank account on which both father and 
son had signing authority. While they never committed their agreement to 
writing, they did register their partnership with the state in 2003. The father 
prepared the tax returns. They did not file a partnership tax return. Instead, 
each reported half of the income on his individual return for 2004 to 2006. 
The father, however, deducted most of the expenses from the businesses on 
his return for those years, though occasionally he allocated some expenses to 
his son.
A threshold issue was whether the father and son had a partnership for tax 
purposes. Unsurprisingly, the court held that they did given that they jointly 
operated the business for profit and in fact did profit.59 Since there was no 
written agreement, the partners’ shares of income and expense had to be deter-
mined according to PIP. While the father had put in significantly more funds 
than the son, $2.5 million versus $800,000, the son contributed far more ser-
vices. While it might have been possible to allocate a disproportionate share 
of the expenses to the father if they had followed the economic effect rules 
and maintained capital accounts, the partnership did neither. (Apparently, 
the father never took a partnership tax course.) Moreover, the father’s treat-
ment of expenses was essentially random. In some years he deducted 75% of 
the expenses, in other years less, and in one year he only deducted 11.4% of 
depreciation and section 179 expenses. There was no evidence that explained 
these variations. For the years at issue, the expenses were paid from farm 
revenue, so arguably the father did not bear a disproportionate share of the 
burden for the expenses in light of the fact that father and son divided the 
farm income equally. If the source of payment was divided equally, it strongly 
suggested that each bore the burden of the expenses equally. There was no 
evidence that either received a greater share of nonliquidating distributions, 
and no evidence whatsoever as to how a liquidating distribution would have 
been made, had the business been liquidated.
The strongest argument that the father and son were not equal partners 
was that the father made a much larger capital contribution. But that fact, by 
itself, was in the court’s view insufficient to overcome the other evidence of 
59 This is roughly the definition of a partnership both for tax and state law purposes. See, 
e.g., Podell v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 429, 431 (1970); Luna v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1067, 
1077 (1964); Unif. P’ship Act (1997), § 102(11) (amended 2013), 6 pt. II U.L.A. 17 (2015). 
Given the focus of this Article, I go into much less detail than the court in this regard.
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equality or the regulatory presumption of equality that existed at the time.60 
The father’s greater capital contributions might have played a larger role in 
the court’s reasoning if they had been made closer in time to the years under 
review. It is not clear from the opinion when those capital contributions were 
made, but it appears to have been in the early years of the partnership, per-
haps the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. Also, to the extent there was an agree-
ment that the son would inherit the business, arguably the father shifted 
some of his capital interest to the son, diminishing the importance of the 
capital contribution difference.61 
Accordingly, the court concluded that the father and son were equal part-
ners both for income and expenses for the years in question. Given the total-
ity of the evidence, it is hard to see how the court could have reached a 
different conclusion even if the regulatory presumption of equality had not 
existed. Had father and son done their homework, they likely could have had 
a valid agreement for a different sharing arrangement of expenses, but they 
did not. Incompetence rarely works in a taxpayer’s favor.
H.  Renkemeyer v. Commissioner
As tax cases go, Renkemeyer v. Commissioner62 is fairly famous, though not 
for its discussion of PIP, but instead for the failed (and borderline juvenile) 
attempt by the partners to avoid Social Security and Medicare taxes (self-
employment taxes) imposed by section 1401.63 While the last judicial word 
has not been spoken on this issue, taxpayers have had some success using S 
corporations to avoid self-employment taxes by underpaying salaries to the 
shareholder or employee.64 No case has sanctioned a similar effort using a dif-
ferent type of entity before Renkemeyer, and it is not clear why the taxpayers 
in Renkemeyer used a state-law partnership to this end. What makes the case 
especially entertaining is that it involved a law firm that specialized in federal 
tax law. One wonders what grades its partners received in their tax courses.
60 See supra note 18.  
61 The court did not discuss the potential income tax impact of any capital shift to the 
son. Under Regulation section 1.721-1(b)(1), a current capital shift would constitute current 
income to the son. Whether the promise to devise property to the son constitutes a capital shift 
has not been addressed, to my knowledge, but seems doubtful.
62 136 T.C. 137 (2011).
63 See Amy S. Elliott, Renkemeyer Could Reignite Entity-Employment Tax Debate, 130 Tax 
Notes (TA) 1244 (Mar. 14, 2011) (though the potential expressed in the title is doubtful).
64 See Watson v. United States, 757 F. Supp. 2d 877 (D. Iowa 2010), aff’d, 668 F.3d 1008 
(8th Cir. 2012); Walter D. Schwidetzky, Integrating Subchapters K and S and Beyond, 18 Chap. 
L. Rev. 93 (2014); Walter D. Schwidetzky, Integrating Subchapters K and S—Just Do It, 62 Tax 
Law. 749 (2009); see also Karen C. Burke, Exploiting the Medicare Tax Loophole, 21 Fla. Tax 
Rev. 570 (2018).
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The law firm operated through a Kansas LLP.65 About 99% of the law firm’s 
income was from legal services. In 2004, the partnership amended its part-
nership agreement to provide for two classes of ownership interests: “General 
Managing Partner Partnership Units” and “Investing Partnership Units,” 
with the general managing partner partnership units having full authority 
to act on behalf of the partnership. All the partners were active in the law 
firm. In 2004 and 2005, the partnership allocated 99% of its income to the 
“Investing Partnership Units” and claimed that this income was exempt from 
self-employment taxes under section 1402(a)(13). That section of the Code 
exempts income of a limited partner from self-employment taxes. The court 
concluded that active general partners cannot qualify as limited partners 
under section 1402(a)(13), making all of the partnership income subject to 
the applicable section 1401 self-employment taxes, the only sane holding that 
the court could have reached.66
On its way to the self-employment tax holding, the court also had to 
address the fact that for 2004, the partnership inexplicably did not provide 
the court with a partnership agreement—though a written agreement appar-
ently existed. The partnership claimed that the 2005 partnership agreement, 
which was provided to the court, was essentially the same as the one for 2004. 
The court did not accept this allegation, though it noted that even if it had, 
it would not have resolved the question of how income for 2004 should have 
been allocated to the partners.
In 2004, the partnership had three individual partners and one corpo-
rate partner, RCGW Investment Management, Inc. (RCGW), a Kansas 
Corporation. RCGW was owned by an ESOP, the beneficiaries of which were 
the individual partners of the partnership. RCGW was an S corporation that 
was primarily engaged in buying, selling, and leasing real estate—an ESOP 
structure that is not uncommon. The 2004 partnership return showed the 
partners’ interests in profits and losses to be 30% each for the three indi-
vidual partners and 10% for RCGW. The capital interests, on the other hand, 
were held 33⅓% each by the individual partners—thus RCGW did not have 
a capital interest, as such. Notwithstanding those percentages, the partner-
ship in 2004 allocated over 87% of its ordinary income to RCGW. Given 
that it was an S corporation, its income flowed through to its owner, an 
ESOP, a nontaxable entity, making the income tax free. Needless to say, the 
87% allocation to RCGW was at the center of the litigation for 2004. As the 
65 At the risk of insulting the reader’s intelligence, an LLP is a general partnership that has 
made an election to have a liability shield.  Every state has an LLP statute, and yes, it would 
be crazy not to make the election. See Mark A. Sargent & Walter D. Schwidetzky, The 
Limited Liability Company Handbook § 3:18 (Supp. 2018).
66 For a failed attempt to achieve the same result using guaranteed payments, see Castigli-
ola v. Commissioner, 113 T.C.M. (CCH) 1296, 2017 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2017-062. An appar-
ently passive LLC member was treated as a limited partner for self-employment tax purposes 
in Hardy v. Commissioner, 113 T.C.M. (CCH) 1070, 2017 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2017-016. See 
Burke, supra note 64, at 612–13.
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court observed, the 2005 agreement would not have permitted this alloca-
tion, making the taxpayers’ argument that the court could rely on the 2005 
agreement for 2004 specious.
The Service argued that the partnership’s ordinary income should be allo-
cated based on the general profit and loss percentages, i.e., 30% to each of 
the individual partners and 10% to RCGW. Since there was no written part-
nership agreement before the court for 2004, the allocations had to be made 
according to PIP. The court noted the PIP factors in the Regulations and that 
those factors had been considered in reaching the holdings in Holdner and 
Ballantyne. As noted above, those factors are (1) the partners’ relative capital 
contributions to the partnership, (2) the partners’ respective interests in part-
nership profits and losses, (3) the partners’ relative interests in cash flow and 
other nonliquidating distributions, and (4) the partners’ rights to capital upon 
liquidation. The Regulations do not limit themselves to these factors. Rather 
they are examples of relevant facts and circumstances. Nevertheless, the court 
made the stated factors its focus. That could be a dangerous approach in some 
cases, but in this case it seemed justified given the evidence before the court. 
Running through the factors, the court noted that RCGW did not appear 
to have made a capital contribution, but that the partnership return showed 
the individual partners to each own 33⅓% of the capital. The income and 
loss shares were 30% each for the individual partners and 10% for RCGW. 
Distributions were made to the individual partners—though the amounts 
were not clear—but not to RCGW. Finally, there was no information in the 
record as to rights to distribution of capital or rights on liquidation. The court 
concluded that this evidence supported the Service’s view that the partners’ 
interests in income for 2004 should be based on the profit and loss shares, i.e., 
30% each to the individual partners and 10% to RCGW.
The court’s holding was in some ways generous. Given that RCGW did 
not contribute capital or receive distributions, there were facts in the record 
to support even a smaller allocation of income to RCGW than ten percent. 
Further, while there may have been nothing in the record about liquidation 
rights, the court could have taken judicial notice of section 807(b) of the 
1997 Uniform Partnership Act, which requires the partnership in liquidation 
to “make a distribution to a partner in an amount equal to any excess of the 
credits over the charges in the partner’s account.”67 Given that RCGW did 
not contribute capital, it would potentially receive less than other partners 
on liquidation under state law. Conversely, the income allocation to RCGW 
67 Unif. P’ship Act (1997), § 807(b), 6 pt. II U.L.A. 498 (2015). For a reasonably accurate 
discussion of state law interaction with the tax rules, see Borden, supra note 1, at 1092–98. But 
Borden also states that “[u]ltimately, state law governs the allocation of the partnership’s eco-
nomic items and determines the partners’ economic interests in the partnership.” Id. at 1131. 
That statement is not entirely correct. State law could govern if the partnership agreement has 
no relevant provisions, a situation virtually unheard of in any agreement made with the assis-
tance of tax counsel (though, as this case shows, not completely unheard of—tax lawyers may 
be their own worst clients). See Unif. P’ship Act (1997), § 103, 6 pt. II U.L.A. at 333–34.
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would have increased its credits under the UPA and, therefore, what RCGW 
could have received in liquidation. Those credits would not have been reduced 
by distributions, as was the case for the other partners, inasmuch as RCGW 
did not receive any distributions. But liquidation was likely a long way off, 
making the present value of that liquidation right very small. Further, the fact 
that RCGW, unlike the other partners, did not receive current distributions 
might have reduced the value of RCGW’s interest more than any downstream 
liquidation rights might have increased it. All of this argues against the full 
ten percent allocation given RCGW. Of course, it would have been novel 
for the court to award the Service with more than it had asked for the indi-
vidual partners. But if it had, by how much should the court have reduced the 
ten percent allocation? Coming up with the amount of any reduction under 
these facts would be quite speculative, so the court’s focus on income and loss 
shares is defensible, though its failure to address state law is not.
V.  Should Treasury and the Service Change the PIP Regulations?
One commentator complained that that the Service will have a hard time 
challenging allocations under the PIP Regulations.68 That concern, as I hope 
this Article makes clear, is at odds with the case law. Three things are striking 
about the case law: (1) that there is not more of it; (2) that the courts did not 
have much difficulty applying the PIP Regulations; and (3) that in each case, 
the court generally reached the correct, or at least a defensible, decision. If 
the PIP Regulations were fundamentally deficient, “woefully lacking” as one 
commentator put it,69 this is not the outcome one would have expected. At 
least for the cases the courts have faced, the PIP Regulations are getting the 
job done.
It is true that the Regulations are hardly overkill. As one article skillfully 
showed in working through a variety of fact patterns, there are many varia-
tions on the PIP theme, and there usually is no ironclad answer available for 
an untested fact pattern.70 But, there is also no set of Regulations that can 
cover every conceivable scenario. For example, take the facts of the Tobias 
case.71 There is no way regulatory writers could have realistically anticipated 
that fact pattern in a set of Regulations of reasonable length. The lack of 
greater regulatory specificity did not do injury in that case or any of the other 
litigated cases.
A benefit of the PIP Regulations is that when partners fail to abide by the 
substantial economic effect rules, they had better have their ducks in a row if 
they want their allocations to survive scrutiny. Courts have a fair amount of 
flexibility given the brief nature of the Regulations. There are few constraints 
on a judge who wants to unwind a complex deal designed to game the tax 
68 See Borden, supra note 1, at 1127–28.
69 Id. at 1105. Borden did not discuss any of the relevant case law.
70 See Carman, supra note 1, at 217–22.
71 See supra text accompanying notes 48–53. 
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system. Thus, tax advisors who are doing more than just playing the audit 
lottery will want to have strong arguments that any structure that does not 
comply with the substantial economic effect safe harbor is driven by econom-
ics. At the same time, the cases to date do not suggest that judges are abusing 
their discretion. They are looking at the substance and reaching a defensible 
answer, usually the only defensible answer.
I have heard the argument made, albeit not in print, that advisors try to 
use PIP to end-run the substantiality rules of the substantial economic effect 
test.72  This effort is wholly misguided. The whole point of PIP is a focus 
on the economic reality of a given structure.  Anyone attempting such an 
end-run is gaming the tax system and, by definition, making allocations that 
are not reflected by the underlying economics, and thus not in accordance 
with PIP.
It is likely not a coincidence that the PIP cases to date have involved poorly-
advised taxpayers—arguably including, paradoxically, tax lawyers them-
selves—in fairly simple deals with few players. It seems unlikely at this point 
that, for example, the Service has never audited a target allocation structure. 
Consequently, it has either concluded that the structure meets PIP or negoti-
ated a resolution that the taxpayers could live with that did not result in a 
large, additional tax bill. Otherwise, by now, one would expect to have seen a 
case involving the validity of target allocations.
To be sure, the fact that the courts have come to grips with PIP in the 
relatively simple situations discussed in the cases above, does not prove that 
courts will be equally successful with more complex deals. How would the 
courts have fared if the facts had involved such complexity as waterfalls and 
flips? In fact, courts have addressed very complex transactions in other con-
texts, and, at least on appeal, were able to reach the correct answer. If one 
considers the “Castle Harbour” line of cases, which involved a highly complex 
effort to game the tax system by turning lenders into alleged partners, the 
appellate courts did not lose the forest for the trees and concluded that no 
valid partnership existed.73 (Admittedly, the federal district court trial judge 
72 Thanks to Daryl J. Sidle, Esq. for bringing this to my attention.
73 TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D. Conn. 2004), rev’d on other 
grounds, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006), on remand, 660 F. Supp. 2d 367 (D. Conn. 2009), 
rev’d, 666 F.3d 836 (2d Cir. 2012). For an excellent article that looks at this and similar cases, 
see Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Sham Partnerships and Equivocal Transactions, 
69 Tax Law. 625 (2016). Borden argues that, because the Second Circuit did not address the 
validity of the allocations involved in that case, “[t]he IRS’s position suggests that the alloca-
tion rules’ deficiencies make them unreliable and perhaps unenforceable.” Borden, supra note 
1, at 1128–29. This argument in the context of the Castle Harbour line of cases is not coher-
ent. Because there was no tax partnership, the allocation rules were irrelevant. The notion that 
the Service argued that there was no tax partnership because it could not figure out how to 
address the allocation rules is inconsistent with the facts and the opinions. The Service’s best 
argument, some might say its only intelligible argument given the facts, was that there was 
no tax partnership. The case was a significant victory for the Service. See Burke & McCouch 
supra, at 636–47.
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did not do as well—repeatedly.) Further, while Tax Court judges tend to have 
litigation rather than transactional backgrounds, they certainly have the com-
petence to deal with complexity. There is little reason to think that the judi-
cial system cannot handle the complexity, though to be sure, a given judge 
might not be up to the task.
If it were possible to craft a more comprehensive set of PIP Regulations, 
one that would provide reliable answers in a wider set of circumstances, it 
might make sense to do so. But history does not suggest that would be a 
successful enterprise. As we have seen over and over again, longer and more 
complex regulations bring with them their own problems. Professor Bayless 
Manning coined the term “hyperlexis” over 40 years ago and defined it as a 
“pathological condition caused by an overactive law-making gland.”74 I would 
reframe it as an overactive law and regulation-making gland. More is not 
always better. The more complex the regulations, the more likely it is that 
unexpected problems will be created. At some point the cure can be worse 
than the disease. Succinct regulations that are workable in most situations 
should be left alone. Further, and as noted above, there is simply no way a 
set of regulations could be written to cover all, or even most, scenarios. There 
are too many ways clever tax counsel can draft agreements and too many 
ways ill-advised taxpayers can blow it. Realistically, it would be very difficult 
to meaningfully improve on the current PIP Regulations, and, as also noted 
above, in some ways more general rules are preferable precisely because they 
are more flexible and less likely to lock a judge into an incorrect answer.
That said, there is an addition to the Regulations that would be helpful. 
Professor Daniel Goldberg proposed that the Regulations adopt a safe harbor 
for target allocations.75 I think his proposal is very sensible. To the extent the 
Service becomes aware of a common, long-standing allocation methodology 
not covered by the existing Regulations, it makes sense to provide formal 
guidance. The guidance increases planning certainty and likely reduces trans-
action costs. I do not mean to suggest that the Service run down every new 
gimmick, but when an allocation system not covered by the Regulations has 
stood the test of time, it makes sense for the Service to address it. Target 
74 Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 Nw. U. L. Rev. 767, 767 (1977); 
see Walter D. Schwidetzky, Hyperlexis and the Loophole, 49 Okla. L. Rev. 403 (1996); Gor-
don D. Henderson, Controlling Hyperlexis—The Most Important “Law and ...,” 43 Tax Law. 
177 (1989); Richard M. Lipton, “We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us”: More Thoughts on 
Hyperlexis, 47 Tax Law. 1 (1993); see also Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Reflections on the Regula-
tion Process: ‘Do Regulations Have to be Complex’ or ‘Is Hyperlexis the Manna of the Tax Bar?’, 
51 Tax Notes (TA) 1441 (June 17, 1991); Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, 
Consequences, and Cures, 42 Duke L.J. 1 (1992); John A. Miller, Indeterminacy, Complexity, 
and Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplification in the Law of Taxation, 68 Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1993); 
Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Complexity, Reform, and the Illusions of Tax Simplification, 2 Geo. 
Mason L. Rev. 319 (1994). For a dissenting view, see Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape 
of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Conten-
tious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 4 (1983). 
75 See Goldberg, supra note 27, at 724–30.
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allocations are clearly in this category. This approach might mean amend-
ing the Regulations, but it also might mean something as simple as issuing a 
revenue ruling.
VI.  Conclusion
Bert Lance, President Jimmy Carter’s short-lived director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, popularized the phrase: “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix 
it.” At the end of the day, the PIP Regulations are getting the job done. Any 
effort to craft a more detailed set of generally applicable regulations would 
likely offer little benefit, and lengthy, revised regulations could easily create 
more problems than they resolve. Nevertheless, a safe harbor for target alloca-
tions would be a useful addition to the existing Regulations and would create 
a more certain regulatory environment for those making proper use of this 
entirely reasonable allocation structure. Should other reasonable allocation 
structures not covered by the existing Regulations become widely adopted, 
additional safe harbors for them would be sensible.
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